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ABSTRACT
APPROACHES TO MULTIPROCESSOR ERROR RECOVERY USING AN ONCHIP INTERCONNECT SUBSYSTEM
RAMAKRISHNA VADLAMANI, B.E., V.J.T.I. UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI
M.S.E.C.E, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Russell G. Tessier
For future multicores, a dedicated interconnect subsystem for on-chip monitors was
found to be highly beneficial in terms of scalability, performance and area. In this
thesis, such a monitor network (MNoC) is used for multicores to support selective error
identification and recovery and maintain target chip reliability in the context of
dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS). A selective shared memory
multiprocessor recovery is performed using MNoC in which, when an error is detected,
only the group of processors sharing an application with the affected processors are
recovered. Although the use of DVFS in contemporary multicores provides significant
protection from unpredictable thermal events, a potential side effect can be an increased
processor exposure to soft errors. To address this issue, a flexible fault prevention and
recovery mechanism has been developed to selectively enable a small amount of percore dual modular redundancy (DMR) in response to increased vulnerability, as
measured by the processor architectural vulnerability factor (AVF). Our new algorithm
for DMR deployment aims to provide a stable effective soft error rate (SER) by using
DMR in response to DVFS caused by thermal events. The algorithm is implemented in
real-time on the multicore using MNoC and controller which evaluates thermal
information and multicore performance statistics in addition to error information.

v

DVFS experiments with a multicore simulator using standard benchmarks show an
average 6% improvement in overall power consumption and a stable SER by using
selective DMR versus continuous DMR deployment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Recent high-end single and multiprocessors from Intel (Montecito), AMD
(Opteron) and IBM (Cell) use extensive on-chip monitors for run-time estimates of
temperature, power and performance. Specific uses of monitors to determine system
critical soft-error failures, wear-out detection and security issues require fast
connections on a global scale. These connections can be supported by a separate lowoverhead interconnect, called monitor network-on-chip (MNoC) [1], that can be
coupled to the main multicore architecture (Figure 1). Although simplified as compared
to conventional network-on-chip interconnect, this new interconnect technique supports
irregular routing topologies, priority-based data transfer and customized monitor
interfacing that suit most on-chip monitoring applications. Collected monitor data
values are manipulated by one or more processors categorized as monitor executive
processors (MEPs) and the results are used to control an SoC’s run-time operation. For
an eight core system, the area and power overhead for the interconnection of 192
thermal monitors is less than 0.5% [1].
As the number of processors in a multiprocessor system increases, system
reliability becomes of great concern. Numerous error detection and error recovery
techniques (for fault tolerance) have been devised to assess processor errors and restore
the correct multiprocessor system operation [2][3][4][5][6][7]. These approaches
typically contain a fault control architecture consisting of an error monitor or an error
detection unit, a controller for ensuring proper supervision of the fault tolerance
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algorithms, restoration circuitry and inter-module interconnect. Common monitors
include soft-error detectors, delay monitors, thermal monitors, and processor activity
monitors. Typically, the interconnect resources used to connect monitors and
controllers are simple point-to-point connections or buses. As system complexity
increases, current monitor interconnections are likely to become increasingly unwieldy,
encouraging the use of MNoC. Towards this end, initially this work examines the
feasibility of using MNoC for supporting multiprocessor error detection and recovery. It
was determined that the increasing MNoC delays or the error data injection rate for up
to 32 cores lead to minimal loss of overall multiprocessor recovery performance. This
motivated us to extend the use of MNoC for collaborative on-chip monitoring
applications using thermal and performance monitors in addition to the error monitors.
The fault tolerant approaches based on redundancy including component dual
modular redundancy (DMR) and redundant multithreading [4] may not be appropriate
in all cases as they incur significant performance and power overhead and often require
significant operating system support. A localized, low-overhead error reduction
approach which can be selectively enabled provides a possible alternative.
In general, memory-based components in processor cores are vulnerable to
single event upsets due to radiation. Although large memory structures are often
protected by error checking and correcting circuits, smaller components, such as
instruction queues and retirement order buffers, have less protection. Fortunately, not
every bit flip in these components leads to an observable system error. A component's
architectural vulnerability factor (AVF) states the probability that a fault generated in a
processor structure will result in an error in the program output [8]. The AVF for
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various processor structures has been shown to vary widely both across and within
applications [9]. Previous studies [9][10][11] have described the efficient run-time
estimation and use of AVF for single core processors in an effort to promote stable
processor failure in time (FIT) rates. However, the growth of multicore use and frequent
per-core voltage and frequency scaling necessitates the reexamination of AVF
calculation and use.
Control
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Figure 1: Detailed view of MNoC for multicores

Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) is commonly used in multicores
to reduce hotspot temperatures and system power consumption. Unfortunately, voltage
decreases and frequency increases can adversely affect system reliability [12][13],
necessitating a fast system response to maintain a stable multicore soft error rate. One

5

approach to maintaining system reliability is to enable a small amount of redundant
resources for critical system components in the presence of increased soft error risk.
This risk is determined by comparing the instantaneous AVF for the components
following DVFS against a predetermined threshold. If the threshold is passed,
redundant components are enabled to facilitate DMR actions.
In this final experiment the power effects of using AVF-enabled DMR in a
multicore environment implementing DVFS are explored. AVF values for critical
resources are continually assessed throughout processing but special consideration is
given following thermally-induced voltage and frequency scaling. Thermal and AVF
monitor data are transported to a centralized controller via MNoC. The controller
collaboratively uses the data to perform DVFS on affected cores and to enable/disable
redundant resources. Our approach is designed to scale to tens of cores, enabling
flexible fault coverage and performance and power control enhancement. A multicore
architectural simulator and an interconnect simulator are used to assess the power and
performance benefit of this approach for 8 and 16 processor multicores. An overall
power benefit of 6% on average is achieved versus the continual use of redundant
resources.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed background
related to processor error recovery, AVF, DVFS and monitor interconnects. The
feasibility experiment for use of MNoC for a shared memory multiprocessor system is
discussed in chapter 3 with results. Our collaborative monitoring approach, along with
the algorithms and results are described in chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis
along with some discussion on future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1. Errors and their detection techniques
2.1.1. Errors
A microprocessor system is susceptible to numerous types of transient and
permanent faults. Transient faults include soft errors due to alpha particles, signal cross
talk, and supply voltage fluctuations. Permanent faults include errors due to
electromigration (wearouts) and manufacturing faults. With respect to reliability, the
International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors has predicted significant
reliability problems for future systems, which will increase at a pace that has not been
seen in the past [14]. Srinivasan et. al [15] showed a three-fold increase in processor
wear out related faults when scaling from 180nm to 65nm. Similarly, Borkar [16]
estimates a 100-fold increase in transient faults when scaling from 180nm to 16nm,
while Shivakumar et. al [17] predict an even higher nine-orders-of-magnitude increase
in logic circuits’ transient fault rates from 1992 to 2011.
Checkpointing and rollback techniques can be used for both transient and
permanent error recovery. A recently-introduced fine-grained recovery technique [18]
uses rollback to counter permanent errors. A BIST-based error detection technique is
used to test the output of microprocessor components such as ALUs, multipliers, and
decoders. In this approach, damaged units are removed from the microprocessor
datapath. The presence of multiple functional unit instances in the architecture allows
for continued microprocessor operation, albeit at somewhat reduced system speed.
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The checkpointing approach described in the next chapter is most appropriate
for soft error recovery. Following recovery, the system re-executes checkpointed
instruction on the same set of components. The availability of these components allows
for continued high performance continuing forward from error recovery. The use of
MNoC to identify and transport error information quickly is vital to rapid system
recovery.
2.1.2. Error detection techniques
Numerous techniques have been developed to quickly identify system errors.
Dual modular redundancy (DMR) uses redundant processor components, such as
processor pipelines, to generate completely redundant streams of results. A result
mismatch indicates an error that must be addressed. A similar software-based approach
uses redundant threads. Two threads can be used to determine the same results on two
different processors. A result mismatch indicates an error. A final approach compares
error detection codes (CRC) for computation. The Fingerprinting [19] approach
compares hashed signatures of the execution history of the processors involved in DMR
to determine an error for a block of computations.
In this work, DMR is used as an error detection technique. Section 3.3 discusses
our use of DMR in error checking.
2.1.3. Error containment
In a multiprocessor system, error checking and recovery can be performed at
various system levels. Often, it is desirable to verify data at a specific level and prevent
faulty values from moving to a higher level. For example, it might be desirable to
contain a data error in an L1 cache rather than having the faulty value propagate to main
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memory. The selection of the error containment level determines the amount of
required checkpointing. If containment is performed close to the processor core, the
amount of checkpoint storage is reduced. However, increased error detection may lead
to an increased critical path length [19]. Figure 2 depicts containment at various levels.
The pipeline level error detection technique used for IBM z series [20] systems reduces
the impact of error checking on the critical path by performing computation and data
checking simultaneously. The checkpointing scheme presented in this thesis focuses on
the shared cache and the internal registers of each processor in a multiprocessor system.

Figure 2: Illustrating error containment. (a) Core containment, (b) Cache
Containment, (c) Memory containment. Adapted from [19]

2.2. Checkpointing and Rollback
2.2.1. Checkpoint
For microprocessor systems, checkpoints provide a snapshot of the architectural
system state [21], including register and cache values. Frequently, copies of state values
are stored in a reliable location in case they are needed later for system recovery.
Checkpointing captures all information required to restart microprocessor or
multiprocessor execution from a previous execution point. Usually, checkpointed
information is saved in parity or ECC protected buffers that are error-tolerant. Although
state data can be transferred to buffers immediately following a checkpoint, incremental
9

checkpointing provides a more measured approach to data transfer by slowly
transferring changed values to buffers incrementally following a checkpoint. Either
approach to checkpointing allows for the recovery of data which is changed following a
checkpoint. A key challenge in checkpointing is system recovery speed following error
detection. By introducing a low latency path from error detection to checkpoint
rollback, we enhance overall system recovery speed. This approach is especially suited
to real time systems where speedy recovery from a fault is extremely desirable.
2.2.2. Error Recovery
This term suggests system-level error recovery techniques. They are broadly
classified into two categories: forward error recovery and backward error recovery.
2.2.2.1. Forward-error recovery
Forward-error recovery (FER) approaches attempt to identify and correct system
errors through redundancy. For example, triple modular redundancy [2] of critical
system components can be used to identify single faults. As the name suggests, three
copies of each vulnerable component generate three copies of data. Since two of three
functional units will continue to generate results which agree, normal system processing
can continue unchecked simply by polling for the majority. FER systems require no
checkpointing or rollback but suffer from excessive hardware overhead. As a result,
FER is primarily used only in the most extreme operating environments (e.g. space
exploration and military applications).
2.2.2.2. Backwards error recovery
Backwards-error recovery (BER) or rollback recovery typically uses some form
of checkpointing, error detection, and rollback. The rollback process generally involves
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restoring system state to a previously saved, correct configuration. Rollback is achieved
by copying previously saved data to its original location in a cache, register file or
memory.
2.2.3. Checkpointing and Rollback
A number of checkpointing and rollback schemes have been developed for a
variety of containment levels [19] for single [21][20] and multiprocessor [2][3][22][23]
systems.
A summary [22] of low overhead checkpointing schemes for backward error
recovery (BER) assesses these techniques. Hardware-based checkpointing and rollback
schemes can be classified using a taxonomy with three main characteristics:
1.

Data error containment - This characteristic refers to the error

containment granularity discussed in section 2.4. Any datum that propagates outside a
system level is assumed to be correct.
2.

Relative checkpoint location – This characteristic refers to the

hierarchical location of the checkpointed data. Dual storage refers to the case when
checkpoint data is stored in a location that is closely attached to the unit that is
checkpointed. For instance, using a register buffer to checkpoint internal registers
would fall under this category. Leveled storage indicates that checkpoint data is stored
elsewhere in the memory system hierarchy. For instance, cache blocks or registers could
be checkpointed in main memory.
3.

Separation of checkpoint and active data – Full separation refers to the

storage of checkpoint data in separate memory locations for dual storage. For example,
register file checkpointing could take place in a separate physical buffer adjacent to the
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register file. Partial separation typically involves incremental checkpointing where
active and the checkpointed data are stored at the same buffer [21][3][23].
For a multiprocessor system, cache-level checkpointing and error recovery [3]
can use a recovery buffer implemented alongside an L1 cache and a modified cache
coherency protocol. Process checkpointing includes saving register values and flushing
cache block values that have been modified since the last checkpoint. In general, cache
blocks are not saved to a restore buffer immediately following a checkpoint. As cache
values are modified, the original cache values are slowly migrated to the restore buffer
for storage. A checkpoint counter, Ccount is incremented every checkpoint interval if
multiple checkpoints are maintained. The buffer stores copies of modified cache lines
for each checkpoint. A checkpoint identifier, Cid is associated with each cache block. If
Cid is less than Ccount for a specific cache block, the block will be moved to the buffer if
a write occurs. During rollback, cache blocks in the recovery buffer that are associated
with a specific checkpoint are written back to the cache. The processor internal
registers that were also checkpointed are reloaded and execution is restarted.
Another technique that operates in a similar fashion is SafetyNet [23]. This
approach only maintains a single checkpoint and assumes about 100,000 clock cycles
between checkpoints. Before a checkpoint can be completed, all multiprocessor
operations must be validated as complete and correct. Once this status has been attained
for all shared data values, the checkpoint identifier can be advanced.
2.3. Architectural Vulnerability Factor
As discussed in section 2.1, transient errors, including soft errors, are expected
to be more frequent in future technologies. Current hardware- and software-based
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Figure 3: Time varying metrics and AVF behavior. The AVF values are along
the Y-axis and time in cycles along the X-axis
redundancy techniques for implementing error detection assume a 100% probability
that a given fault will manifest itself into an error and hence a failure. However, prior
13

work has suggested that this is almost never the case [9][11][8] and usually the
vulnerability of the functional units such as the instruction queue, register file, control
logic, etc to soft errors varies widely with workloads and execution time as indicated in
Figure 3[9].
A fault is a defect in a hardware or software component. An error is the
manifestation of a fault resulting in a deviation from the expected results. Hence, a fault
can cause errors but an error may not cause faults. A fault that is masked by virtue of a
program execution flow will not result in an error. Vulnerability factor, as defined in
[8], is the probability that an internal fault in a device during its operation will result in

Figure 4: Classification of possible outcomes of a faulty bit in a
microprocessor. SDC=silent data corruption, DUE=detected unrecoverable
error. The figure is taken from [24]
an external visible error. Failure is caused by errors and is characterized by nonperformance of expected action. A corrected error, however, does not cause failures.
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Figure 4 [24] summarizes these concepts and demonstrates their interdependency
clearly.
Mukherjee et. al [8] invented the term architectural vulnerability factor (AVF),
which is a measure of the likelihood that a fault will convert into a visible error.
Gurumurthi et al. [9] and Xiaodong et al. [10] have come up with competing online
techniques for computing the AVF for several processor functional units such as the
load/store queue, register file, control logic, etc. Mukherjee et al. [25] have shown that
for an Itanium2-like processor architecture the AVF for the instruction queue lies
between 14% and 47%, while the AVF for the execution unit lies between 4% and 27%.
Similarly, for an Alpha21164-like architecture the AVF for the pipeline structure has
been found to not exceed 10% [26]. These metrics suggest that affected processor units
can potentially benefit from an AVF-aware redundancy scheme that disables redundant
units during periods of low AVF, thus saving power [8][11][9].
Accurate run-time AVF evaluation has recently been shown to be
computationally feasible [8][9]. Walcott, et al. [9] and Biswas, et al. [11] demonstrated
that the aggregated AVFs of uniprocessor pipeline components can be estimated with
up to a 90% accuracy using a small set of periodically-sampled microarchitectural
parameters. This quantized-AVF (Q-AVF) approach is lightweight since the amount of
processed data is restricted to a small quantum over a restricted sampling interval.
These approaches open up an opportunity to dynamically enable the fault
tolerant redundant infrastructure only when the AVF is above a predefined threshold
during the course of operation of the processor. Gurumurthi et al. perform a thorough
offline simulation-based statistical analysis (involving complex calculations) for
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extracting the AVF information from a set of easily-traceable processor performance
metrics and use the results in an online predictor. This approach requires calibration for
different workloads to be able to use it for a variety of real world applications. Xiadong
et al. on the other hand, propose a method of estimating AVF entirely online in which,
artificial errors are introduced in the functional units at a predetermined rate and the
number of instances where a program failure occurred is noted to compute the AVF.
The AVF computation for a structure involves identifying the architecturally
correct execution (ACE) bits (i.e. those that matter or influence the final output of a
program) and un-ACE bits in that structure. Whether a bit is ACE or not depends on
how a user has defined the program output. un-ACE bits are categorized as architectural
and micro-architectural un-ACE bits. Examples of architectural un-ACE bits are the
operand part of a NOP instruction and a prefetch instruction. If an error strikes a
prefetch instruction, it will be ignored leading to a performance loss but it will not
cause an incorrect execution. Micro-architectural un-ACE bits consist of the data and
status bits in an IDLE state, bits in a mis-speculated state or predictor structure, etc.
Thus, AVF computation for a structure (or a processor as a whole) is generally expected
to be expensive and is therefore performed every several million instructions. When the
combined AVF for the entire processor is known to have crossed a predetermined
threshold for the past interval, the pipeline is flushed, redundant units for error
detection are enabled and execution is restarted, so that the processor is protected for
the next interval.
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2.4. Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling and AVF
AVF varies with the operating frequency and voltage of a component since it
impacts the utilization of the component [27]. In Soundararajan, et al. [27], this
variation was quantified for DVFS applied to a uniprocessor. More recently, Siddiqua
and Gurumurthi [28] used AVF variation to support redundant multithreading (RMT) in
an effort to reduce soft errors. In the latter two cases, SER levels are considered static
and unaffected by per-core variations in voltage and frequency.
2.5. AVF-aware Dual Modular Redundancy
Error detection for storage components in processor-based systems is often
performed using dual modular redundancy (DMR), in which outputs of duplicate copies
of a component are compared before memory commits are performed [29][30]. DMR
incurs a power consumption penalty and should only be used if a processor component
is likely to incur soft errors. Many storage-based processor pipeline components are
protected without the need for DMR. Register files and caches are generally protected
by ECC/parity-check circuitry. Pipeline latches can use low-overhead error self
detection and correction (i.e. Razor) [31].
Stojanovic et al. [69] came up with an ECC-protected instruction queue
implementation for out-of-order processors, which has a performance overhead of less
than 3% and an area overhead of the order of 10% of the size of the structure. Due to
the small footprint of the additional bits and associated logic for error correction, the
power dissipation is also quite less. Although our work uses DMR based error detection
technique, our reliability stabilization system can work even with the ECC based
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approach. Since the power consumption by the ECC-based circuits is a small
percentage of the total chip power, the benefits we see may not be significant.
Additionally, the AVF of a branch predictor is always 0% since a misprediction
due to a predictor soft error strike will not lead to an output error [29]. As a result, as
seen in chapter 4, this work focuses on the DMR protection of specific components
(instruction queue, retirement order buffer, and load store queue) which would
otherwise be unprotected. The detection and rollback circuitry required to restore
processor state following error detection has been discussed in detail in chapter 3 and is
not described again in chapter 4.
2.6. Inter-monitor interconnection
Traditionally bus-based connections and point-to-point connections were
commonly used for on-chip communication on SoC’s. Velusamy et al. interfaced
thermal sensors to a central controller using a bus interface [32]. McGowen et al.
implemented an embedded feedback control system in which, the thermal and voltage
sensors were connected to the analog-to-digital converters of the microcontroller
through point-to-point links [33]. A number of error recovery techniques have been
developed that propagate error data and response information through point-to-point
interconnects. For instance, a recent error recovery system [34] uses clock-skewed flip
flops to detect pipeline errors. Error results are individually sent to a control block that
initiates instruction-retry recovery operations. An alternative approach uses area and
time redundancy to improve the fault tolerance of counters [7]. In this effort, the error
detection and corresponding recovery is also conducted using a point-to-point
interconnect. In an integrated approach [35], an SoC resource manager architecture is
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individually connected to performance and thermal monitors. The IBM Power6 monitor
network [36] is composed of eight critical path delay monitors per core that are used for
detecting errors during processor operation. These monitors, along with other on-chip
monitors, are interconnected using a daisy chain bus.
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CHAPTER 3
MNOC-BASED SHARED MEMORY MULTIPROCESSOR ROLLBACK
RECOVERY SYSTEM
3.1. Introduction
In general, most multiprocessor systems in use today are based on the sharedmemory programming model. These systems are frequently implemented as chip
multiprocessors (CMPs), symmetric multiprocessors (SMPs), or distributed sharedmemory multiprocessors (DSMs). The application of MNoC to monitors and control
processors for this system represents a challenge.
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SM – Shared Memory
Pn – Processor n
L1 - L1 Cache
L2 - Shared L2 cache
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Pn

Figure 5: Shared memory multiprocessor system
Consider the shared memory multiprocessor system shown in Figure 5. For our
experiment, we consider a system of 8 to 128 processing nodes, which could be used in
the following configurations depending on the application under consideration:
1. Single process, multiple threads (one thread per processor)
2. Multiple processes, one thread each
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3. A combination of the above two scenarios. For example, 5 cores could be
included in configuration 1 and the rest of the cores could be included in
configuration 2.
4. Multiple processes and multiple threads. This approach will involve context
switches between processes.
3.1.1. MNoC Perspective
Scenario 3 provides an ideal configuration for testing of our monitor networkon-chip infrastructure. For scenario 3 it would be necessary to have central controller to
decide which nodes need to be rolled back when one node generates an error. A low
latency MNoC provides a path to quickly forward monitor data and assess a rollback
strategy.
3.2. Typical Interprocessor Communication
In this example it is assumed that a single process (P), multi-threaded (T1, T2)
application is running on a system configured under scenario 3. Communication has
been established between threads T1 and T2 (can be extended for more processor
cores). As a result of repeated computation, a data value D is written by T1 and
consumed by T2. Thread T1 informs T2 of the available data value by setting a sync bit.
Soon after T2 reads this data, it clears the sync bit to acknowledge the receipt of the
data. Then T1 puts a new data value at D and the cycle continues.
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Figure 6: Typical inter-processor shared memory communication and a rollback
scenario
Assume that D = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 is written in a sequence and they have been read
and acknowledged by T2 with repeated handshakes through the sync bit (note Figure 6).
It is later discovered that an error was generated while processing data, D=3. At this
point in time T1 is in the process of or has already generated the next data, D=4 since
T2 had acknowledged the data, D=3. Hence, the system needs to roll back to a point
when the memory had data value, D=3, so that T1 can roll back to an instruction that
will set the sync bit and then generate D=4 and T2 can roll back to an instruction that
would attempt to read D=3 from the memory.
In the next few sections we present checkpointing and rollback techniques to
address the above recovery issues and also to highlight the benefits achieved by the use
of MNoC.

3.3. MNoC Based Rollback Recovery Scheme
3.3.1. Architecture Description
Our MNoC-based recovery approach extends previous checkpointing methods
[3][22][23]. The process of taking a checkpoint involves defining the checkpoint
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interval and logging modified data in recovery buffers. The rollback process involves
the restoration of logged data and the restart of computation from the saved checkpoint
time. Dual modular redundancy of each processor pipeline is used for error detection;
data mismatches are flagged as errors. Figure 7 provides an overview of the mechanics
of the error recovery scheme.
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Figure 7: Error recovery scheme using MNoC
The L1 buffer holds L1 cache values that are overwritten during a checkpoint
interval. In the worst case the buffer would need to be the same size as the cache. If it is
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smaller, more frequent checkpoints may be required. The size of the internal register
buffer for each checkpoint is equal to the number of internal registers. A checkpoint
counter guides the checkpointing process. The value of the counter is incremented
automatically every checkpoint interval. The number of simultaneously active
checkpoints will be a research parameter.
The L1 recovery buffer is the main sub-module of the error monitoring system.
If data in the recovery buffer needs to be restored, a rollback control state machine is
used to coordinate the recovery. This unit conducts the checkpointing and rollback
process for each node. Every node houses an error detection system to gather the error
signals and transport them to the central processor, the monitor executive processor
(MEP). Following processing, a rollback response message is generated by the MEP.
Figure 8 illustrates the error detection system in a node.
3.3.1.1. Duplicate pipeline
For each multiprocessor node processor, the processor pipeline is duplicated and
fed with the same instruction sequence as the main pipeline. All accesses to the internal
register file and the L1 cache are compared with those of from the duplicate pipeline
and any error is flagged. The current DMR implementation is a simplified version of
the one used by the IBM G5 processor [20].
3.3.1.2. Error detection comparators
These comparators are situated at the input of the L1 Cache and at the input of
the internal register file for every node in the multiprocessor system. These comparators
detect any data mismatches created by the redundant processor pipelines. As shown in
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Figure 8, the comparators operate in parallel with data accesses, outside of the critical
path.

Processing Node

Instruction
Pipeline

To/From
L2 Cache

L1
Buffer

L1 C
Cache

Checkpoint
Counter

To duplicate
Pipeline

Data Bus
Rollback
Control
RECOVERY
UNIT

Reg
Buffer

Reg C
File

Error Data
Register

NODE
ID

ERROR
MONITOR

Instruction Result Bus

From duplicate
Pipeline

C

Comparator for
error detection

R

Network Router

Rollback
Signal

Interface
R
Control
X-bar

R

Interface

MEP

Figure 8: Error detection system using MNoC

3.3.1.3. Error Monitor
This is a lightweight module that is interfaced to an MNoC router. This module
gathers error data and sends out rollback signals to associated recovery units. As shown
in Figure 8, the Error Data Register (EDR) is composed of the following fields:
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EDR[1:0] - the error signals from each of the two comparators, EDR[9:2] - the current
checkpoint counter value, EDR[13:10] - the pre-programmed NODE ID of the node.
The EDR is read through a MNoC router and is forwarded to a MEP for further
processing.
NODE ID information is used by the MEP to determine the source of the error
data. The MEP uses this information in conjunction with the assignment of tasks to
processors to coordinate a checkpoint recovery response. Specific processors involved
in the rollback are identified.
3.3.1.4. Error Data
For 16 processors, the EDR will consist of 14 bits of information. This can be
scaled appropriately for up to 128 cores. To protect stored data, it is assumed that the
internal register file, register buffer, L1 cache, L1 buffer, and L2 cache are all protected
by error correction codes (ECC) to correct soft errors in these memory units. This
feature is omitted from Figure 8 for clarity.
3.3.1.5. Incorporating MNoC
The error data generated by each node is stored in their respective error
monitors. This data is transported to the nearest MEP via MNoC so that a rollback
signal can be generated for the appropriate nodes in the multiprocessor system. The
MNoC implementation requires a router at every error monitor as shown in Figure 8.
Due to the critical nature of error detection, a priority channel is allotted for the quick
transport of error data to the MEP. When the MEP receives the error data, the NODE
ID is used to identify affected processors. A rollback message that consists of a rollback
signal and a checkpoint number is then sent to the affected processors.
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3.3.2. Checkpoint Process
As shown in Figure 7, checkpointed memory units include the L1 cache and the
internal processor registers. The checkpoint counter stores a checkpoint number (CN)
whose value is incremented automatically every pre-programmed interval that is at least
equal to the error detection latency. Whenever a write access is made to any of the two
memory units, the current checkpoint number (CN i) is tagged to the written data.
However, before the data is written, the checkpoint control checks to determine
whether the previous checkpoint number tagged to the old data at that location is less
than the current checkpoint number. If yes, the old data was modified in the previous
checkpoint interval and should hence be logged in the buffer before new data is written
to the location. After new data is written, its corresponding checkpoint number is
updated to the current value in the checkpoint counter. Figure 9 summarizes this
checkpointing process.

3.3.3. Rollback Process
The recovery unit initiates the rollback process in each node to restart the
execution of the system from a previous safe execution point. As soon as the rollback
signal is received from the MEP, the following actions are performed by the local
controller.
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Figure 9: Illustrating the checkpoint process
Rollback Steps for the processor:
a. The recovery buffer freezes its checkpoint state and no pending instructions
are allowed to update.
b. Data corresponding to the checkpoint interval is copied from the L1 buffer
to the L1 cache. The remaining locations in the L1 cache are invalidated.
c. The L1 buffer is reset
d. The saved register state in the recovery buffer is restored
e. The instruction fetch is restarted.
Note that we need to store the checkpointed data for two previous checkpoint
intervals. This is necessary to accommodate a situation where in the error that occurs in
a previous checkpoint interval is detected in the following checkpoint interval. In this
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case, the system must rollback by two checkpoints instead of one, since the last
checkpoint was taken on an error data which is not desirable for restoration of the
system state. Hence, in case of an error we always rollback the system by two
checkpoints instead of one.
The MEP would need to send the checkpoint number to which each
participating processor needs to rollback to ensure that every processor is aware of it.
This may not seem necessary since the checkpoints are synchronized, however, the
rollback message from the MEP to each processor may not reach at the same time due
to unpredictable network delays. In such a situation the processor to which the rollback
message reaches last might have just hopped a checkpoint interval. In this case that
processor will not know to which past checkpoint number it should rollback.
Error registered
in the Error Data
Register
Terr2samp

Rollback signal
received by the
node
Tsamp2mep

Tmep2resp

Tresp2rb

Timeline
Terr_lat
Figure 10: A closer look at the error detection latency on timeline
3.3.4. Error detection latency
Error detection latency, denoted by Terr_lat, indicates the time interval between
when an error, as indicated by one of the error detection comparators, occurs to the time
when the rollback signal reaches the recovery unit. For ease of analysis, the latency can
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be split into multiple sections. Figure 10 depicts the latency on a timeline. Individual
components of the time include:
Terr2samp – The time from when the error data is written to the EDR to the time when
it is read by the network.
Tsamp2mep – The time from when the data in EDR is read by the network to the time
when it reaches the MEP.
Tmep2resp – The time spent in the MEP to calculate the response (i.e. rollback
information)
Tresp2rb – The time spent transporting the rollback signal to the recovery unit in an
affected node.
3.3.5. MNoC deliberation
The timeline in Figure 10 suggests that Terr_lat can be reduced significantly by
optimizing the interconnection between an error monitor and the MEP. This
enhancement has a direct impact on the parameters Tsamp2mep and Tresp2rb. The use
of MNoC reduces these values, resulting in a faster error response. Another advantage
of keeping Terr_lat as low as possible is that checkpointing can be carried out more
frequently, if necessary.
3.4. Experiments and results
The checkpointing and rollback control, checkpoint counter, L1 and register file
buffers, the error detection unit and the error monitors described in section 3.3 were
implemented in the SESC [43] architectural simulator. The configuration of the
simulator is summarized in Table 1. Each core is assumed to contain 24 thermal, 8
delay and 1 error monitor, which are all interfaced to the MNoC in a manner described
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in [1]. MNoC latency numbers for 8, 16 and 32 cores in the presence of thermal, delay
and error monitor traffic were estimated using our modified PopNet simulator. These
results were used in assessing the performance impact on the multiprocessor rollback
recovery. Four benchmarks from the SPLASH2 suite, Ocean, Radix, Lu and FFT, were
run on the multicore system, each for about 100 million cycles.
Table 1: Experimental Setup
Simulator

SESC multiprocessor simulator

Number of Processors

8, 16, 32

Processor Configuration

Alpha264 EV6 -like
L1 $ = 32KB (private, writeback)
L2 $ = 1 MB (shared, writeback)
32 Internal registers (64bit)

Soft Error Rate (SER)

1 in million cycles

Checkpointed components L1 $, Internal registers checkpointed every 1 million cycles
Benchmarks

Ocean, Radix, LU, FFT (100 million instructions each)

3.4.1. Simulation model
The SESC multiprocessor simulator was modified to evaluate the benefits of
MNoC for a multiprocessor rollback recovery system. The following modifications
were implemented in the SESC simulator to better suit our experimental need.
a) Checkpoint counter: As discussed earlier, we needed a checkpoint counter to
keep track of the current checkpoint interval ID and also to advance the interval
periodically. The simulator was updated with this additional feature.
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b) L1 buffer, internal register buffer: Section 3.3.1 discussed the role of the L1
buffer and the internal register buffer in the checkpointing process. The
functionality of these buffers was incorporated into the simulator.
c) Recovery unit: As discussed in section 3.3.3, the recovery unit plays a major role
in rollback recovery. The state machine that controls the checkpoint and
rollback process was implemented closely with the processor core, the L1 cache
and their respective buffers.
d) Error detection system: Pipeline duplication was performed for our DMR
approach. Also, we modified the simulator to use a comparator at the data
interface between the pipeline write back stage and the L1 cache and the
interface between the write back stage and the register file. These comparators
interface to the error data register in the error monitor that is connected to the
MNoC.
e) MNoC: This interconnect has been modeled using the Popnet network simulator
[63].
f) MEP: The MEP could be implemented as a custom state machine or we could
use a dedicated processor to carry out MEP tasks. We dedicated one processor
in our multicore system for the MEP.
3.4.2. MEP software flow for rollback recovery
The multiprocessor system under consideration will likely have groups of
processing nodes that share tasks. For example, in a system consisting of 16 nodes, 4
nodes might run a mutually-shared application, while the next four perform a separate
shared application. In such a scenario, only the nodes affected by an error require
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rollback. In our experiments, the MEP software consults a static lookup table in which,
each entry is loaded with the processor identification (PID) along with the ID of the
application that it runs for all the cores in the system. When the MEP receives an error
data (which is annotated by the NODE_ID), it is indexed to extract the application ID.
The MEP then sends out the recovery to all the cores that are tagged with this
application ID. The rest of the rollback steps are performed inside the individual cores
as described earlier.
3.4.3. Impact of variation in MNoC delay on recovery performance
As the number of cores is increased from 8 to 32, there is a proportional
increase in the number of error, thermal, and delay monitors. Due to this, the network
traffic and hence the network delays increase significantly. Using the corresponding
latencies offered by the MNoC for these varying workloads (as derived in [1]), the
overall impact on the recovery performance has been studied. For comparison, we
assume two systems, one in which MNoC is used as an interconnect for transporting the
monitor data traffic to the MEP and the control action from the MEP back to the cores
and another in which MNoC is replaced by a hypothetical interconnect that has a
structure which is similar to MNoC but has zero latency. By this way we can accurately
measure the impact of increasing MNoC delay on the recovery performance. In both the
systems, checkpointing, rollback and error detection systems are active. In this
experiment we assume the presence of soft errors that strike at an average rate of once
in a million cycles. The graph in Figure 11 shows the performance impact for four
benchmarks. The performance impact is not more than 0.1% for a 32 core system. The
performance degrades with increasing MNoC delay because it contributes to
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Figure 11: Impact of MNoC delay on the recovery performance as compared to
non-MNoC case having a zero latency interconnect
the rollback latency and hence the rollback overhead.
The above experiment assumes the use of a regular channel in the MNoC. It was
shown in [1] that the priority channel incurs a much lower latency than the regular
channel, almost in the range of 20-30 cycles for up to 32 cores and above, provided the
priority channel traffic is about 5% of the regular channel traffic. Since, soft errors have
been shown to be very infrequent, the use of a priority channel is well justified. The
impact on the recovery performance due to MNoC latency, when a priority channel is
used, will be less than 0.01%. This is a 10x improvement over the regular channel
MNoC case.
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Figure 12: Performance degradation due to MNoC delay and rollback overhead
The graph in Figure 12 shows the impact of MNoC delay on the multiprocessor
recovery performance when compared to a system that did not have any faults. This
result helps us visualize the contribution of not only the MNoC delay but also the
rollback overhead to the overall performance degradation. We see that the performance
degrades by less than 1% for a 32 core system.
3.4.4. Impact of increasing error rate on recovery performance
The motivation behind this experiment is to assess the performance of MNoC
when applied for errors other than soft errors which are much more frequent. For
instance, delay-related errors arising due to the fluctuations in the supply voltage or
voltage droops are a major concern. Similarly, dynamic voltage scaling (DVS) using
delay error detection and correction is performed by reducing the supply voltage below
the point of first failure (PoFF) until the error rate does not exceed 0.1% [37] or 0.04%
[38] to achieve a higher overall energy gain. This experiment studies the performance
of MNoC-based error recovery when employed in such relatively high error rate
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scenarios.
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Figure 13: Impact of increasing error rate on recovery performance for a
multicore system compared to non-MNoC case having zero latency
As in the previous experiment, we consider two systems, one in which MNoC is used as
interconnect and the other in which a hypothetical zero latency interconnect is used.
This comparison across various error rates, number of cores and benchmarks will
accurately model the impact of increasing MNoC delay on the recovery performance.
The graph in Figure 13 shows that for error rates as high as 0.01% (i.e. once every
10000 cycles) the impact of MNoC delay on the recovery performance for a 32 core
system is less than 0.6%. The effect on system performance is noted next.
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The graph in Figure 14 shows the impact of the increasing error rate on the
recovery performance when compared to a system with no faults. This indicates the
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Figure 14: Impact of increasing error rate on recovery performance due to the
MNoC latency and rollback overhead
contribution of the MNoC delay and the rollback overhead to the overall performance
degradation. We see that the performance degrades by a significant margin as the error
rate increases to 0.01% for a 32 core system.
In conclusion, the use of MNoC for various kinds of error monitors is practical.
This result motivates us to look at further enhanced experiments that involve
collaboration between different kinds of monitors like the architectural vulnerability
monitor that could work with the error monitor in providing better overall power and
performance.
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CHAPTER 4
MULTICORE SOFT ERROR RATE STABILIZATION USING ADAPTIVE
DUAL MODULAR REDUNDANCY
4.1. Introduction
Previous work by Soundararajan et al. [27] assesses the impact of various DVFS
schemes on AVF for a single core. Hence it allows them to choose a specific DVFS
scheme that optimizes the architectural vulnerability factor (AVF) the best, resulting in
a reduced reliability impact. In contrast to [27] and [28], a system is developed that
maintains the reliability of a multicore chip under a specified target failure-in-time
(FIT) error rate while thermal-aware DVFS is performed. The reliability impact of
DVFS is countered by a proportional increase in the amount of error protection in terms
of increased DMR. To perform this action, a chain of relationships between the
instantaneous values of voltage, frequency, soft error rate (SER) and AVF are derived to
determine an optimum AVF threshold value for each processor. Once the AVF
threshold is set, redundancy is enabled (disabled) when the instantaneous AVF crosses
above (below) this threshold. The trend graphs in Figure 15 illustrate our idea.
Due to the masking nature of the AVF, the effective SER of a chip can be
written as follows [8]:
Effective_SER = AVF * Raw_SER -------------- (4.1)
If DMR-based error protection is always provided, the effects of SER can be
completely eliminated. However, for a given SER target, if AVF information is
exploited, it is not necessary to provide error protection 100% of the time. Instead, it
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suffices to provide protection to a structure only when the AVF of that structure
exceeds a predetermined threshold. Thus we can imagine the term AVF in equation
(4.1) to be an AVF threshold since any errors occurring when AVF > AVF-threshold are
corrected by the protection that becomes enabled.
Effective_SER = AVF-threshold * Raw_SER -------------- (4.2)
Our goal is to maintain the Effective_SER constant as required by the chip
specifications in the presence of a DVFS scheme. AVF is the probability that a bit
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Figure 15: Conceptualization of collaboration between AVF, voltage and
frequency information from across multicores to dynamically arrive at an AVF
threshold value. Refer eq. (1) and (2) as well.
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the program behavior and flow. Since a program execution is cycle dependent, AVF
seems to be independent of frequency of operation of a processor as shown in Figure 14
(a). Referring to Figure 15 (d), AVF does not change with supply voltage [27]. Since
AVF is based on the utilization of a structure, the processor operating frequency affects
the instruction flow rate through the structure and changes its AVF [27]. SER has been
shown to increase in proportion to the operating frequency and reduce exponentially
with the supply voltage [39]. In general, the variation in a structure’s AVF due to
frequency or other parameters will not impact the AVF threshold, since the presence of
a threshold will compensate for the increased AVF by enabling redundancy more
frequently. However, a change in the raw SER due to temperature or voltage variation
(Figure 15(b), (c)) requires a corresponding change in the AVF threshold to maintain a
constant effective SER (refer to equation (4.2)). This observation forms the basis for the
graphs in Figure (e), (f), (g). Hence, AVF threshold is a function of instantaneous supply
voltage and frequency. The DVFS algorithm assumes that the frequency scales linearly
with supply voltage as discussed in [12] and [13] (Figure 11(h)).
4.2. Adaptive AVF Calculation and Use for DMR
Our adaptive DMR approach requires real-time AVF computation and the use of
an interconnect architecture for thermal monitor and system parameter data collection
and processing. Three specific operating scenarios are considered in which real-time
AVF information is used to enable/disable component-based DMR for the instruction
queue (IQ), retirement order buffer (ROB), and load-store queue (LSQ):
1.

AVF information is used to enable/disable DMR for the components

which exhibit an AVF below a predetermined, fixed threshold.
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2.

AVF information is used to enable/disable DMR for the components

which exhibit an AVF below a dynamically-determined, variable threshold which
changes with voltage and frequency updates.
3.

AVF information is ignored and DMR is always enabled for the

components.
Each of these cases is considered in the context of multicore DVFS performed
in response to thermal events.
4.3. Disabling DMR Components
Power gating and clock gating are two common procedures to reduce the
dynamic and static power consumption of processor structures.
Power gating involves disabling the header transistor in the gates that help
reduce the leakage in addition to overall power. Hence, this technique has an associated
timing overhead. Hu et al. [67] have discussed this overhead in detail. Homayoun et al.
[68] have discussed the potential of power gating for instruction queue in a superscalar
processor, since this unit is usually responsible for 27% of a superscalar processor.
Their technique has been shown to reduce up to 95% of leakage power during idle
times.
Clock gating has a comparatively lower timing overhead since it involves gating
of the clock supply to a module rather than gating all the gates in the block [44]. This
does not reduce the leakage power to a large extent. As a result, the power savings are
expected to be lower than the power gating approach.
Our work focuses on power savings of our variable AVF threshold approaches.
Hence, we use power gating for the unused redundant resources (IQ, ROB or LD/ST
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queue) in each processor and assume that the resulting performance overhead is
tolerable.
4.4. AVF Computation in a Multicore Environment
AVF calculation for IQ, ROB, and LSQ components must occur periodically
since AVF values typically show significant run time variation [9][29]. The AVF of
each component is determined using microarchitectural parameters obtained from the
processor. A linear combination of eight parameters can be combined [11] to describe
the AVF for each component at an accuracy level approaching 90%. These parameters
include:
1.

Stores flushed before data translation lookaside buffer response.

2.

Store buffer utilization

3.

Retirement order buffer empty cycles

4.

Retirement order buffer utilization

5.

Branch misprediction count

6.

Reservation station utilization

7.

Instruction queue utilization

8.

Total front-end instruction kill latency

Each parameter is scaled and linearly combined to form the AVF estimates for
the three components (IQ, ROB, LSQ) in each processor. Since our processor model is
slightly less complex than the one used in [11], the coefficients for parameters 1, 6, and
8 are set to zero. The five remaining parameters related to AVF calculation are
commonly monitored in hardware in microprocessors. The required performance
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monitoring hardware often consists of two parts [40], an event detector and an event
counter.
To evaluate AVF in our system, fixed event detectors and counters are needed to
collect desired performance information. For example, store buffer (STB) utilization
can be determined by monitoring store buffer write and read events. A corresponding
counter for STB utilization increases by 1 when an STB write occurs and decreases by 1
when an STB read occurs. Since the size of the STB is known, it is straightforward to
calculate STB utilization from the counter. The same method works for the utilization
calculation of an ROB, a reservation station and an instruction decode queue. Event
detectors are connected to both the read and write signals of the target structure. A write
event increments the counter and a read event decreases the counter for the target
structure. To determine ROB empty cycles, an event detector is connected to the ROB
empty signal. A count is incremented for each cycle the signal indicates an ROB empty.
The similar method works for the branch misprediction counter. The event detector is
connected to a misprediction signal. Whenever a misprediction happens, the counter
increases by 1.
Figure 16 shows the structure of a processor pipeline and the associated AVF
monitoring circuitry. Event detectors are connected to the IQ, LSQ, ROB and branch
predictor to probe operations in these units. Some detectors have been omitted from this
figure for clarity. Five counters are connected to the corresponding detectors to obtain
utilization information for the five parameters. The hardware cost of the performance
counters and detectors is modest. AVF calculation is performed every 1024 cycles [11]
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Figure 16: AVF monitor for one pipeline
leading to a counter requirement of 5 * 10 bits = 50 bits. Each detector can be
implemented in a small number of logic gates.
The hardware overhead required to duplicate the IQ, LSQ, and ROB is also
modest. For our architecture, based on an Alpha264, a total of 16, 112 and 176 thirtytwo bit values are needed (see Table 2). This analysis indicates a total of 9728 storage
bits. As a result, the total hardware overhead for per-core AVF-enabled DMR is about
200K transistors, a small percentage of the total processor transistor count, including
cache.
As shown in Figure 16, monitored information is transferred to a centralized
processor using an interconnect network (MNoC), which is discussed later in this
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chapter. The centralized processor (MEP) calculates the AVF of each core based on the
obtained counter values.

4.5. Reliability-aware AVF threshold computation
Processing components require a stable SER to operate properly. Due to the
masking capability of the AVF, the effective SER of a processor core [8] is defined as:
Effective_SER = AVF * Raw_SER

(4.3)

The Raw_SER (total expected bit flip rate) is reduced to an Effective_SER
since not all soft errors eventually affect the visible program output. Processors
generally have a target effective_SER threshold (Target_SER) which is predefined for
the architecture. To ensure proper operation, it is desirable to keep the instantaneous
SER of the processor core components below the target SER. If the rate rises above the
target SER threshold, resource redundancy can be used to mitigate errors. Equation
(4.3) can be rewritten as:
Target_SER = AVF_threshold * Raw_SER

(4.4)

which indicates that the target SER threshold is directly related to the
AVF_threshold. If the Raw_SER is constant, the need for component redundancy can
be directly determined from the measured AVF. A measured value for a component
which is above the AVF threshold indicates the need for DMR. Otherwise, DMR can be
deactivated.

SER (V , f )  SER0  10

d (1 x )
1 f min

(4.5)
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In most cases, however, Raw_SER is not constant. For example, the SER fault
model in Equation (4.5) [12][39] assumes an exponential relationship for SER with
respect to the frequency and supply voltage. In the equation, f min corresponds to a
normalized minimum-energy frequency [41] (e.g. an fmin of 0.2 indicates the minimum
frequency is 20% of the maximum) and x indicates the relative scaling of f and V
between their min and max values.
Frequencies below fmin (typically 5% of fmax [41]) consume additional energy
due to increased memory latency. Parameter d = 2 is based on the expected fault
injection source [12]. SER0 is the raw SER corresponding to the maximum voltage and
frequency used by the multicore. This model indicates that both AVF_threshold and
instantaneous SER must be considered in determining the need for DMR. If raw SER
increases, the AVF threshold used to enable redundancy must be reduced so that target
SER levels are not crossed. In summary, the relationship between AVF_threshold and
Target_SER can be expressed as:
AVF_Threshold = Target_SER/SER(V,f)

(4.5)

where SER(V, f) can be calculated using Equation (4.4).

4.6. Example AVF threshold and overhead computation
The AVF thresholds used for experimentation in this work were determined as
follows. Mukherjee et al. [8] determined a FIT of approximately 200 to 2000 for the
200,000 vulnerable bits in the SPARC64 microprocessor. Since each core (based on an
Alpha264) in our example multicore has roughly 10% the number of vulnerable bits of
a SPARC64, raw_SER in Equation (4.3) is set to 28 FIT. Additionally, Mukherjee et al.
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determined a 1000 year mean time between failures (MTBF) for a SPARC64 and
suggested that MTBF should be increased proportionally for each core when a
multicore system is considered. For our 8 core system, an MBTF of 8000 years is used
to achieve an overall 1000 year MTBF. This MTBF corresponds to a 14 FIT per core
(109/8000*365*24), which is our target_SER. Using Equation (4.4), an AVF_threshold
of 50% is determined.
Our system dynamically computes AVF thresholds for each core in the system
based on current frequency and voltage values. A two-level DVFS system is
implemented which switches the voltage and frequency between more aggressive
(2GHz, 1.2V) and less aggressive (1GHz, 0.84V) parameters. Since f min for our system
is equal to 0.05 * fmax, fmin is set to 100MHz/2GHz = 1/20 after normalization. When
this value of fmin and the raw_SER (i.e. SER0) of 28 FIT are used in Equation (4.4), a
new raw_SER at 0.84V, 1GHz is set to 10 times SER0. Using Equation (4.5), this value
leads to an adjusted AVF_threshold of 25% for low voltage (0.84V). This adjustment
can be applied since AVF values are influenced by frequency changes [27].

4.7. Experimental Approach
4.7.1. Monitor Network on Chip
Our AVF-enabled DMR approach benefits from the use of a dedicated
interconnect for monitor traffic. The five microarchitectural parameters listed in section
4.3. are collected by an AVF monitor located in each processing core (Figure 16). The
monitor interfaces to lightweight monitor network on chip (MNoC) routers which
transport the information to a centralized monitor executive processor (MEP) [1]. The
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irregular topology support provided by MNoC is suited to the distributed placement of
an AVF monitor and one MNoC router in each core (Figure 17). In addition to AVF
information, MNoC also transports thermal monitor information and control
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L1$
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P8

Redundant
Units

AVF calculation
related counters
R

R
MNoC
R

Router

MEP

Monitor Executive
Comparators for
error detection

R
MEP

Figure 17: An 8-core system for AVF-aware DMR throttling
information which modulates per-core voltage and frequency. A total of 8 thermal
monitors are allocated per core to achieve 0.1 degC accuracy [1].
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4.7.2. AVF-aware DMR throttling
Shared memory multiprocessor systems consisting of 8 and 16 cores are used for
experimentation. Each processor contains the following duplicated pipeline structures:
instruction queue, retirement-order buffer/reservation stations and load/store buffers.
When DMR is enabled for a pipeline component, a per-core error detection system flags
an error if a component output does not match the data from its counterpart. An AVF
monitor, the 8 thermal monitors, and 3 error monitors per core are connected to an
MNoC router via a multiplexer. The error monitor’s low bandwidth limits their impact
on monitor data and processing.
The MEP executes the following DMR throttling algorithm for each redundant
component in each core. Initially, all redundancy is enabled. Each AVF monitor in the
multiprocessor system is then sampled in a round-robin fashion. When the AVF values
for a processor component falls below a predefined lower threshold, the MEP sends a
disable signal for the replicated resource. If the AVF is greater than the threshold, the
redundant resource is re-enabled. Sequentially, the DVFS algorithm on the MEP
proceeds as follows:
1.

Measure the instantaneous values of temperature (T) and AVFs for each

core in each sampling period
2.

If T > threshold, reduce V, f (perform DVFS) for affected core. Update

AVF_Threshold values.
3.

If AVF > AVF_Threshold for a processor component, enable DMR for

the component. Otherwise disable DMR.
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Figure 18: Latency vs. injection rate per router for a 16 router system. Results
were generated using a modified Popnet simulator
The Update_AVF_Threshold routine required in the algorithm uses Equation
(4.5).
4.7.3. MNoC Performance and Interface to AVF monitor
Based on previous work [42], the sampling rate of a thermal monitor is set to 1
per 800 clock cycles at 500 MHz. The five architectural parameters (discussed earlier)
needed for AVF calculation are transferred to the MEP once every 1024 system cycles.
Since one MNoC router is used per core, the injection rate per MNoC router is 8 * (1
per 800 cycles) + 5 * (1 per 1024) = 1 injection per 67 clock cycles.
To assess the expected MNoC monitor data latency in MNoC, a latency
experiment was performed for a 16 processor multicore system. As shown in Figure 18,
as long as the injection rate per router is less than 1 per 17 cycles, MNoC latency
remains consistently low. In our system, the injection rate per MNoC router is low
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enough to provide an MNoC latency of less than 15 clock cycles. For 8 core
multiprocessors, our experiments show a similar 15 cycle latency.

4.7.4. Experimental Procedure and Results
The simulation setup including the configuration of the simulated shared
memory multiprocessor system is summarized in Table 2. A modified SESC [43]
multiprocessor architectural simulator is used to evaluate the run-time effects of DVFS
on a series of applications and the collection of information from one AVF (Figure 16)
and 8 thermal monitors in each processor core. The MEP functionality is assigned to
one of the cores in the simulated multicore system.
The processor power model used by SESC is based on Wattch [44]. The cache
power model is based on CACTI [45] and the temperature model for both (called
SESCSpot) is based on HotSpot [42]. SESCSpot calculates the temperature of processor
subblocks based on the power trace of the architecture in a post processing fashion. The
processor architecture is modeled on an Alpha264 with a MIPS ISA and the floorplan
of each processor core used for thermal modeling is based on prior work [46]. For our
DVFS implementation we integrated SESCSpot into the core of the SESC simulator to
obtain temperature readings at run-time. This approach enabled the MEP to sample the
temperature readings at run-time and execute the DVFS algorithm.
In order to assess the benefits of our AVF-based dual modular redundancy
approach, the three specific operating scenarios are considered:
1.

AVF threshold fixed – DMR enabled when a component AVF passes a

fixed threshold
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2.

AVF variable threshold – DMR enabled when a component AVF passes

a threshold which varies with DVFS based on Equation (4.5).
3.

Full DMR: DMR is always enabled for all three components (IQ, ROB,

and LSQ).
All three of these cases are considered in the context of DVFS. The third case is
the worst case scenario and it is used as a baseline for the other two. The first case

Table 2: System Setup
SESC multiprocessor simulator
90 nm
8, 16
f(high)=2GHz, V(high)=1.2V
f(low)=1GHz, V(low)=0.84V
SPLASH2 (400M instructions
Benchmarks
each)
Processor configuration
Instruction Issue
4 out-of-order
I-cache
64KB, 4-way
D-cache
64KB, 8-way, 2 cycles
Branch Predictor
Hybrid
Branch Target Buffer
4K entries, 16-way
Instruction Queue
16 entries
Retirement Order Buffer 176 entries
Load/Store Buffers
56/56 entries
L2 Cache
1MB, 8-way, 10 cycles
Simulator
Technology
Num of processors
DVFS V, f levels

considers the AVF threshold for a component to be fixed regardless of voltage and
frequency. As a result, the AVF threshold must be set to a reduced value of 0.25 (25%
of bits are important) which is used during both high voltage and low voltage usage.
The second case considers the AVF threshold as dynamically varying as DVFS changes
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Table 3: Power benefit and overhead results for 8 and 16 core system
Test
bench
name
LU

Ocean

FMM

Radix

Case
Full DMR
Fixed threshold
Variable threshold
Full DMR
Fixed threshold
Variable threshold
Full DMR
Fixed threshold
Variable threshold
Full DMR
Fixed threshold
Variable threshold

8 core
Power
Power
per core
benefit
(W)
(%)
11.50
10.88
5.39
10.80
6.09
9.83
9.63
2.03
9.13
7.12
14.28
14.13
1.05
12.28
14.01
4.48
4.38
2.23
4.12
8.04

16 core
Power
Power
per core
benefit
(W)
(%)
11.75
11.19
4.77
11.10
5.53
10.04
9.63
4.08
9.29
7.47
10.28
9.75
5.16
9.69
5.74
4.25
4.13
2.82
3.94
7.29

voltage and frequency levels. AVF thresholds of between 25% and 50% are determined
by the MEP for each processor component.
The power benefits of a variable AVF threshold in enabling DMR are shown in
Table 3 for four SPLASH2 benchmarks mapped to 8 and 16 cores. Portions of each
benchmark are distributed across the cores. DMR is only performed on the specific
processor components which have an AVF greater than the target threshold. On
average, the variable AVF threshold approach (case 1) reduces core power (without
cache) versus full DMR (case 3) by about 8% and 6%, respectively, for 8 and 16 core
processors. An average power improvement of 6% and 2% is seen for the variable AVF
threshold approach versus the fixed AVF threshold approach. In general, the cost of
providing a stable SER through DMR is low. The power cost of including DMR is
about 5% for 8 cores and 6% for 16 versus unprotected scenarios. The power
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consumption of MNoC (~250 mW) is considered in these calculations. The 8-core
FMM application shows a particular savings with a variable versus fixed threshold
(14% vs. 1%) since most AVF values are above the fixed threshold.
Even though the precision of Wattch has not been discussed explicitly, it has
been shown to have an accuracy of 10% and a relative accuracy of 10-13% [44]. Our
power consumption results have been generated using Wattch. Since we measure the
relative benefit, precison of Wattch is an important factor in determining the reliability
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Figure 19: Five AVF traces (Y axis) for an instruction queue across 100 consecutive
sampling intervals (X axis) for the LU benchmark
of our results.
The variability of AVF is apparent from Figure 19, which shows AVF variation
across LU benchmark run time for an instruction queue for five traces of 100 samples.
AVF values are measured over several time trials. In general, calculated AVF is mostly
at or below 50% with frequent deviations over a wide range.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As the process technologies scale and the multicores begin to gain a
commonplace status in the processor based systems, increasing number of on-chip
monitors are expected to be deployed for ensuring high reliability, high performance
and low power. A dedicated interconnect subsystem such as MNoC provides an
efficient, lightweight and programmable on-chip monitor data communication solution.
Different types of on-chip monitors for measuring temperature, critical path delay,
processor error, processor performance among others can be seamlessly integrated
using MNoC and used in several monitoring applications to achieve power, reliability
and performance benefits.
In this thesis, the thermal, error and AVF monitors that are spread across up to
32 cores are integrated using MNoC. The information from these monitors are sampled
in real-time by a central controller, MEP, and used for remedial applications such as
shared memory error recovery, and reliability-and-thermal-aware DVFS for the
multicore system.
Use of MNoC for shared memory recovery approach is shown to provide
flexibility in terms of selective recovery of only affected processors. This approach is
found to be highly scalable for up to 32 cores since it suffered minimal performance
degradation (less than 4%) as the monitor data communication delays increased.
Looking further the remedial system was expanded to include AVF and thermal
monitors in addition to the error monitors, for DVFS applications. Previous work has
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suggested a considerable impact of voltage and frequency variations on the raw SER.
AVF has indicated the presence of an inherent architectural masking that alleviates the
effective SER to a large extent. For a given target effective SER, amount of redundancy
to be enabled in the system can be smartly decided based on the run time AVF of the
structures in the system, while being also sensitive to the raw SER fluctuations. In this
collaborative monitoring approach, a 6% reduction in power is achieved versus alwaysactive redundancy while a stable multicore effective SER is maintained.
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